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The New Media and the Rise of Exhortatory Terrorism

George Michael

The world is becoming a less hospitable place for large, clandestine terrorist organizations. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the “unipolar” era dominated by a sole superpower, the United States. After the Cold War, terrorism initially went into steep decline, in large part because several leading terrorist groups lost material support from communist states in the East and their client states such as Cuba.¹ In an era of globalization dominated by the United States, other countries presumably would have more to gain by accommodation with the West than by confrontation. More and more governments are coordinating their counterterrorism efforts with the United States as they seek to dismantle terrorist organizations and deny them funding and resources. Obviously, this trend accelerated after the attacks of 9/11.² Moreover, new surveillance technology enables better monitoring of dissident groups and potential terrorists. Consequently, larger groups cannot operate effectively because they are more vulnerable to infiltration and disruption.

In adapting to these strategic realities, insurgent and terrorist groups are increasingly using the so-called new media to exhort sympathizers and fellow-travelers to commit acts of resistance on their own initiative. This article examines the relationship between the new media and contemporary terrorism, first by explaining the development of new media. Next, it explores various extremist and terrorist subcultures—the extreme right, the far left, and radical Islam—that use the new media to pursue their strategic objectives. The final section discusses implications of the intersection between the new media and terrorism and suggests policies to meet this challenge.

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The Internet and the New Media

The Internet is at the center of an ongoing revolution in communications and networking which enables new forms of organization and greater dissemination of information. Prior to the Internet, physical proximity usually determined one's associates. Now people are linked across great distances and national borders. Over two billion people worldwide now have Internet access, and when they organize, they tend to do so by affinity.³ Communities of affinity forged through the Internet build a sense of collective identity, resulting in "virtual communities," not unlike the "imagined communities" Benedict Anderson wrote about in his study on nationalism.⁴

The new media developed concomitant with Web 2.0, which arose after the dot-com bubble burst in the year 2000. Out of the rubble, a crop of new web-based companies and services emerged that offered interactivity and "user-generated content." This development enabled greater creative participation from users and facilitated the formation of online communities. Web 2.0 encompasses an array of interactive communications facilitated by a rapidly expanding set of platforms—including blogs, web forums, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—that are linked together in innovative ways. These platforms enable so-called many-to-many communications and the sharing of user-generated content.⁵ The openness of the new media democratized the creation, publication, distribution, and consumption of information. The new media consist primarily of the Internet but also include innovations such as smartphones and text messaging. The rise of the new media ushered in a new era of communications which allowed much greater and broader participation from users, not only in the spheres of commerce and social networking, but terrorism and insurgency as well.⁶

The Internet offers several advantages for dissident movements, such as greater interconnectivity and the power to communicate and network with far more people and more quickly than ever before. Furthermore, encryption technologies enable covert communication and anonymity. Access is inexpensive, which increases availability. The ubiquity of the Internet allows small groups to maintain a global presence that can rival larger entities. Because it is difficult to regulate, the Internet enables political dissidents to circumvent restrictions on speech and avoid censorship.⁷ The growth of bandwidth, combined with the development of new software, permits users to disseminate complex information.⁸ This

communications revolution has empowered individuals to move money, products, information, and ideas across borders—activities previously restricted primarily to governments and big corporations.⁹ Of course, these same capabilities allow terrorists to disseminate propaganda, communicate, raise money, and plan and coordinate operations.

Prior to the Internet, terrorist recruitment depended on face-to-face interaction, which greatly limited the scope of participation. The Internet has given rise to loose, decentralized networks of terrorists that can all work toward a common goal.¹⁰ Several terrorist and extremist subcultures employ the new media to pursue their revolutionary goals: specifically, the extreme right, the far left, and radical Islamists.

The Extreme Right

Since the early 1980s, the American extreme right has evolved from a movement characterized by patriotism to one which increasingly exhibits a revolutionary outlook. This can be explained in large part by the various social trends that over the past several decades have significantly changed the texture of the country. For those in the extreme right, the United States is not the same country they once knew. According to Census Bureau projections, by the year 2050, whites will no longer comprise a majority of the US population.¹¹ Such a development is viewed in near apocalyptic terms in the racialist segment of the American extreme right. Many in the movement consider the “damage” done too great to be repaired by conventional methods. Only radical solutions, it seems, can save the nation and race, which the movement believes are imperiled by a Jewish conspiracy that has been reified in the acronym ZOG, or “Zionist Occupation Government.” During the 1990s, the extreme right appeared to gain ground as a social movement. Trends in technology, such as the Internet, enabled the movement to reach out to a potentially larger audience than in the past.

The American extreme right’s foray into cyberspace came in the mid 1980s, when three electronic bulletin boards were launched—Aryan Nations Liberty Net, White Aryan Resistance, and Liberty Bell.¹² For the most part, these bulletin boards were unsophisticated and did not reach many people. That changed, however, on 27 March 1995, when Don Black, a close associate of Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, launched Stormfront.¹³ Over the years, Stormfront has come to host many extreme right websites and serves as an important entry point for

those curious web surfers who seek them out. As of early 2009, board membership exceeded 159,000, and more than 5.5 million posts had been submitted on the site in response to at least 450,000 threads.¹⁴

The increasing popularity of the Internet dovetailed with the notion of leaderless resistance, which began to gain currency in the extreme right subculture in the 1980s. In 1983, Louis Beam, a long-standing extreme right activist, first released the seminal essay, “Leaderless Resistance,” in which he argued that the traditional hierarchical organizational structure was untenable under current conditions. This essay was disseminated through computer networks which Beam pioneered in exploiting during the 1980s. According to Beam, the US government was too powerful and would not permit any potentially serious opposition organizations to challenge its authority. Beam reasoned that in a technologically advanced society such as contemporary America, the government could easily penetrate the structure of a dissident group and reveal its chain of command. As a strategic alternative, he invoked the “phantom cell” organization model. Applying this model, Beam argued that it becomes the responsibility of the individual to acquire the necessary skills and information to carry out what is to be done. Members take action when and where they see fit.¹⁵

Toward that end, Dr. William L. Pierce (1933–2002), founder and leader of the National Alliance, effectively used the Internet to propagandize. Arguably the most influential theoretician of revolution that the American extreme right ever produced, he was best known as author of *The Turner Diaries*—a fictional story of an apocalyptic race war that convulses America. The novel gained him considerable notoriety and was even thought to have inspired several episodes of right-wing violence, including the campaigns of the Order and the Aryan Republican Army, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the London bombing spree of David Copeland.¹⁶ Perhaps the most widely read book in the subterranean world of the extreme right, the novel had sold between 350,000 and 500,000 copies as of 2000—an astounding figure for an underground book.¹⁷

On his Internet audio program, *American Dissident Voices*, Pierce exhorted people to share his evolutionary outlook. The cogency of his propaganda lies in his analysis of the extreme right’s predicament, which is precarious. Inasmuch as the movement is weak and monitored very closely by the federal government and private watchdog groups, he had

no illusions of successfully confronting “the system” at that particular point in his struggle. He warned that any premature resistance or terrorism would only provoke the government into repressive measures that the extreme right was unable to counter. Nevertheless, Pierce repeatedly maintained that conventional political activity was futile and that armed struggle would someday be inevitable. But until that time came, he emphasized building a revolutionary infrastructure in which he could disseminate his message to more people and expand his following. Pierce and his National Alliance therefore concentrated on building a multi-media propaganda network.

To Pierce, virtually all contemporary institutions in America were corrupt, with no hope of redemption. Still, he believed there were sympathetic people in these institutions who would be receptive to his message. Reaching, educating, and inspiring these insiders was the centerpiece of his revolutionary model. In an age in which the masses were hopelessly misled by the influence of the media, Pierce considered it infeasible to try to organize them into a howling revolutionary mob. Rather than directly storming the Bastille, he sought to recruit insiders who were already part of the machinery of government and institutions with access to the levers of power. When the proper revolutionary conditions arrived, they could then throw open the gates to their ideological compatriots on the outside. As conditions in the world changed, Pierce predicted that leaders and other persons of influence would change their calculations and act accordingly.¹⁸

After his death in 2002, Pierce’s organization experienced a number of setbacks but continues to this day under the leadership of Erich Gliebe. In the final years of his life, Pierce occasionally offered veiled praise for Islamic terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Palestinian suicide bombers who were “paying a terrible price” to liberate their land. Through his various writings and broadcasts, he formulated a doctrine of revolution. In so doing, he created a potentially effective foundation for leaderless resistance, which requires a semblance of ideological cohesion and coherence so members of a movement can act on their own initiative yet still work toward the same goals, however broadly defined. The widespread availability of the World Wide Web has made the propaganda of Pierce and the National Alliance accessible to potential sympathizers around the world. Although the contemporary extreme right in the United States is generally weak and loosely organized, Pierce

formulated the most workable revolutionary strategy the movement ever produced.

At one time, one of the most vociferous online advocates of leaderless resistance was Alex Curtis, a young man who operated the *Nationalist Observer* website out of San Diego, California. Like Beam, Curtis reasoned that at the present time, dissident groups can be too easily infiltrated to mount any kind of organized resistance campaign. Moreover, those organizations that suggest such actions, even in an abstract way, could possibly be slapped with a civil suit for “vicarious liability,” in which they are blamed for influencing the violent actions of others.¹⁹ To avoid these potential pitfalls, Curtis instructed his readers and listeners that they must act entirely alone.

Curtis envisaged a two-tiered resistance organizational structure with an aboveground propaganda arm and a second tier of lone wolves. He advised against formal memberships and meetings, as they offered opportunities for authorities and monitoring groups to identify and gather information on activists and sympathizers. In 1998, he created an Internet site which included an audio “update” program that reviewed and critiqued recent episodes of right-wing violence. Also, he sent out regular e-mail messages to an estimated 800 subscribers.²⁰ In these media, he pointed out mistakes and offered suggestions on how they could be avoided. He counseled lone wolves not to cooperate with authorities and only respond with “the five words”—“I have nothing to say.”

For a while, Curtis was the extreme right’s most vitriolic advocate of terrorism. Each month he would designate someone as “Aryan of the Month.” He bestowed this recognition on lone wolves such as Benjamin Smith, Scott Baumhammers, and David Copeland.²¹ For Curtis, the end justified the means; he once contemplated the suitability of illegal drug sales as a way to further the racial revolution.²² Moreover, he had no compunctions about the most lethal methods of terrorism. One issue of his bimonthly periodical, the *Nationalist Observer*, contained an article which described various biological toxins that could be used as weapons of mass destruction, including the bubonic plague and typhoid.²³

Essentially, Curtis saw leaderless resistance as a means to provoke a crisis atmosphere that would polarize the population along racial lines. Actually, he welcomed measures such as hate crime laws, because he believed that they are selectively used against whites and would engender hostility among them. According to Curtis, leaders in the movement

should never condemn hate crimes perpetrated by whites.²⁴ Although random hate crimes would appear to have little tactical value, he saw them as a means to foment a revolutionary atmosphere.²⁵

To be expected, Curtis' strident rhetoric caught the attention of authorities and monitoring organizations. In November of 2000, he was arrested, along with two other individuals, for various civil rights violations.²⁶ In June 2001, he received a three-year prison sentence and agreed not to consort with activists in the white nationalist movement after his release.²⁷

More recently, Harold Covington has used the Internet to promote his revolutionary strategy. Over the years, Covington has earned a controversial reputation in the extreme right subculture. Highly literate and articulate, he has done a significant amount of writing and theorizing on strategy.²⁸ Yet, he has also been involved in some very bitter internecine feuds that have led some activists to impugn his credentials.²⁹

Beginning in 2003, Covington published a quartet of novels based on a white separatist insurgency in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States.³⁰ Set in the not-too-distant future, the novels extol the exploits of the Northwest Volunteer Army (NVA), which wages a war of national independence. Eschewing grandiose schemes to foment a nationwide white revolution, Covington argues for mounting a separatist guerilla campaign in a limited region. On his online *Radio Free Northwest* program, Covington exhorts racially conscious whites to relocate to the Pacific Northwest to form a critical mass for the formation of his future NVA. To date, he has attracted few volunteers, but he has produced a concrete plan for a guerrilla campaign in the Pacific Northwest. In 2011 Covington began a series of "Brandenburg" lectures in which he discussed the prospect of revolution against the federal government, but he did so in a general rather than specific style to remain within the boundaries of First Amendment protection of free speech.³¹

Various online forums and resources appeal to the militia movement as well. For example, in a short online novelette, *Absolved*, Michael Mandelboegh tells the story of Phil Gordon, a terminally ill Vietnam veteran and ardent Second Amendment advocate. A desperate man with nothing left to lose, he fights off an army of federal agents who seek to confiscate his guns.³² The novel inspired members of a Georgia militia group that allegedly planned attacks on US federal law officers and others.³³

More recently, on 22 July 2011, the Norwegian lone wolf Anders Behrig Breivik, who bombed government buildings in Oslo and went on a subsequent shooting spree which left 76 people dead, employed the new media to get his message out. Shortly before he began his attacks, he uploaded his 1,500-page electronic book, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, on the Internet. He explained in detail how he spent nine years methodically planning his attacks, procuring firearms and tons of fertilizer while evading suspicion from authorities. He also uploaded a video on YouTube titled “The Knight Templar 2083,” which contained numerous references to the Islamic threat to Europe, interspersed with iconic images of Crusaders. Whereas the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, implored major newspapers to publish his manifesto (from which, incidentally, Breivik plagiarized) to ensure maximum exposure of his ideas, Breivik took advantage of the Internet and posted his manifesto online, thus bypassing major media outlets. The notoriety stemming from his attack, he predicted, would serve as a “marketing” ad for his manifesto, thus assuring substantial interest in its contents. Claiming to be a member of the Knights Templar—a medieval order that protected pilgrims in the Holy Land after the First Crusade in the eleventh century—he saw himself as part of an unorganized and leaderless vanguard that would awaken Europe to the perils of Islamicization brought about by the immigration policies engineered by Europe’s liberal parties. In that sense, the seemingly senseless shootings at the youth camp were meant to punish the ruling party for their “treasonous acts against Europe and Europeans.”³⁴

The Far Left

The political left has proven adept at exploiting the Internet as well. In 1999, two researchers at the RAND Corporation, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, first predicted that the old hierarchical organization structures of terrorist groups were giving way to flatter or horizontal organizations that would be more network-based. New information technology, they presaged, would enable these networked insurgencies to take hold. This allowed for “swarming”—an operational innovation whereby dispersed nodes of a network of forces converge on a target from multiple directions to accomplish a task. The overall aim is for network members to converge rapidly on a target and then disperse immediately until it is time again to recombine for a new pulse.³⁵ What

distinguishes net war from previous forms of conflict is the networked organizational basis of the practitioners. Many of the groups are leaderless, yet their members are able to combine in swarming attacks.³⁶ The emergence of so-called amateur terrorism is related to the spread of information technologies that allow dispersed groups and individuals to conspire and coordinate attacks across considerable distances.³⁷

The political left has used the new media to implement swarming protests. For example, in the fall of 1999, diverse elements of the anti-globalization movement converged in Seattle to disrupt an important meeting of the World Trade Organization. Through the Internet, various groups and activists were able to coordinate their efforts and swarm, or come together. Much of the cohesion of the activists stemmed from improvised communications, including cell phones, radios, police scanners, and portable computers. Employing these media, they were able to link into continuously updated webpages and other news sources which gave reports from the street.³⁸ A variety of movements, groups, and activists came together to oppose the “neoliberal” orientation of the global economic order sometimes referred to as the “Washington Consensus.”³⁹ Antiglobalization activists created their own “Independent Media Centers” in those cities where the major protests occurred.⁴⁰ By exploiting new forms of communication, such an Indymedia, activists seek to break the information monopoly of the corporate media and become actively involved producing information.⁴¹

Often associated with the political left, elements of the radical ecology and animal liberation movements have demonstrated adeptness in implementing leaderless resistance. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) was founded in Brighton, England, in 1992 after activists from another environmentalist group—Earth First!—decided to distance themselves from illegal activities. Not long thereafter, the idea of decoupling the aboveground segment of the movement from illegal activities took hold in America. Essentially a leaderless movement, the ELF has no official membership, leadership, or central organization. Rather, ELF activists and cells act autonomously and remain anonymous to the public. Rather than use a formal membership, the ELF produces guidelines that exhort activists to cause economic damage to firms despoiling the environment, educate the public on the harm being done to the environment, and take all necessary precautions to avoid harming life. Since the ELF is essentially a state-of-mind organization, anyone who follows these

guidelines is considered a member.⁴² There is overlap between the ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), another leaderless movement whose members seek to stop animal suffering through “direct action,” which includes illegal activities involving the rescue of animals and inflicting damage on businesses and facilities that use and abuse animals. In various harassment campaigns, ALF activists have used the Internet to target firms that use laboratory animals.

The Internet has enabled mass collaboration on a global scale. The on-line encyclopedia Wikipedia, for example, demonstrates how thousands of dispersed volunteers can create fast, fluid, and innovative products that can outperform some of the largest and best financed enterprises.⁴³ Mass collaboration has its genesis in the open source movement in software. In 1986, Linus Torvalds envisaged an operating system that could be available to anyone. Users would be permitted to modify it with the proviso that they would not license it or restrict its use. That year, the Linux operating system was created by a collaborative effort of numerous independent programmers.⁴⁴ Behind these most successful “crowdsourcing” efforts is a collaborative effort between the crowd and highly motivated individuals that guide them.⁴⁵ The growing accessibility of information and technology puts tools into the hands of people all over the world who are now capable of collaborating on a truly global scale.

A pernicious example of crowdsourcing is the so-called Anonymous group linked to numerous episodes of Internet “hacktivism.” Essentially a leaderless movement, its origins can be traced to 2003 with the launching of the imageboard (a type of Internet forum devoted to the posting of images) “4chan,” which became linked to various hacktivist subcultures. Members maintain online anonymity while conducting civil disobedience, with the primary goal of promoting Internet freedom. With increasing notoriety, the concept of Anonymous as a collective of unnamed individuals became an Internet meme.⁴⁶ Collectively, Anonymous activists consist largely of users from multiple imageboards and Internet forums. Anonymous hacktivists were behind a number of denial of service attacks.⁴⁷ On YouTube, figures purporting to be members of Anonymous wear Guy Fawkes masks popularized by the comic book and film, *V for Vendetta*, and rail against their targets. Members have attacked a variety of online networks including those operated by Arab dictatorships, the Vatican, the Church of Scientology, banking and entertainment firms, the FBI, and the CIA. Indicative of the movement’s

growing notoriety, in 2012, *Time* magazine listed Anonymous as one of “The World’s 100 Most Influential People.”⁴⁸

Authorities have begun taking the antics of Anonymous more seriously. In July 2011, 20 or more suspected Anonymous hackers were arrested in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands following “Operation Avenge Assange.” The group attacked PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa after those firms froze the accounts of WikiLeaks created by embattled Australian journalist, Julian Paul Assange.⁴⁹ In the US Congress, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) demanded that firms, including Amazon, MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal, terminate WikiLeaks’ accounts and refuse to provide the online platform with any services.⁵⁰

Radical Islam

The global Islamic resistance movement has established a robust presence on the Internet despite a multinational effort to eradicate it since 9/11. The Internet is an important aspect of al-Qaeda’s campaign, as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri once declared: “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our *umma*.”⁵¹ To that end, al-Qaeda has a media committee which was first led by a jihadist with the nom de guerre “Abu Reuter.” Presently, the leadership operates more as a communications company, producing occasional videotapes rather than actual terrorism.⁵² In essence, al-Qaeda has become the strategic communicator for a larger global Salafist movement. Over the years, it has stepped up its media operations.⁵³

Apparently, the Iraq war was the catalyst for the surge in the number of jihadist online media outlets since 2003. In the media age, previously local insurgencies whose ramifications remained isolated now have the potential to capture worldwide attention. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the recognized leader of the foreign insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq, mobilized computer-savvy allies to resist the US occupation.⁵⁴ During the Iraq war, he embraced the video camera as a weapon and encouraged militant groups to videotape their operations so they could later be broadcast as propaganda.⁵⁵ Using camcorders and the Internet, he was able to mount international media events at the tactical level which produced tremendous strategic impact. He pioneered a new method of communication and even employed an online press secretary. An online jihadist, “Irhabi007,” was responsible for posting many of al-Zarqawi’s

pronouncements on the web and played a central role in his public relations network. It later transpired that Irhabi007 was Younis Tsouli, a 22-year-old West London resident of Moroccan descent.⁵⁶ His example illustrates how an audience can take an active role in conflicts around the world.

Al-Qaeda's media outreach suffered a setback in 2005, when Al Jazeera stopped airing the organization's videos in their entirety. Meanwhile, the US government and its allies pressured Internet service providers (ISP) to shut down Islamist websites. In May 2008, Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, wrote to Google officials and urged them to take down video produced by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.⁵⁷ Despite these measures, al-Qaeda's web presence has been resilient.

Researcher Brynjar Lia observed a shift from noninteractive, more-or-less official jihadist websites toward a much more multilayered and redundant media production and distribution system.⁵⁸ A thorough scan of the Internet revealed more than 4,300 websites that serve terrorists and their supporters.⁵⁹ Moreover, there are now Islamist sites that reach out to a Western audience.⁶⁰ West Point's Combating Terrorism Center estimated that by late 2007, there were as many as 100 English-language websites offering militant Islamic views. There are also sites for non-Arabic speaking and non-English speaking countries, suggesting a more multilingual propaganda approach. This could enable jihadists to reach a new audience in the West and elsewhere.⁶¹

According to US and European intelligence sources, al-Qaeda's media committee—as-Sahab (the clouds)—has established a secure base in the ungoverned tribal areas of western Pakistan.⁶² According to Lia this so-called e-jihad depends significantly on free web hosting, anonymous access to web storage, and file sharing.⁶³ Websites on which large video files can be uploaded for free and without any ID control are invaluable to online jihadists, allowing them to disseminate high-quality material. Lia identified several categories of jihadist websites, suggesting a division and specialization of labor.⁶⁴ It is now possible for terrorist movements to control the entire communications process so they can determine the content and context of their messages and the means by which they are conveyed to specific audiences.⁶⁵ By doing so, al-Qaeda reaches several target audiences, including both its supporters and enemies. Thus the Internet is an important contributing factor that makes jihadist terrorism

more global in scope by reducing the need for physical contact and enables forming a decentralized structure of autonomous groups that share the same ideology. Furthermore, the anonymity provided by the Internet enables extremists to interact more freely with fewer constraints than in a physical setting where monitoring is pervasive.⁶⁶

Numerous resources for would-be terrorists are available online. For example, al-Qaeda's *Encyclopedia of Jihad* offers religious guidance as well as instructions on terrorism and insurgency. This Internet library allows scattered jihadists not affiliated with al-Qaeda to train at their leisure in their own homes and plan operations with less chance of being detected or interdicted.⁶⁷ Terrorists can find training materials online, such as *The Mujahedeen Poisons Handbook* and *How Can I Train Myself for Jihad*.⁶⁸ Operationally, the Internet allows al-Qaeda to post data and intelligence requirements and ask Muslims to help meet these requests. Most respondents are not al-Qaeda members. Moreover, they can remain anonymous and thus avoid police attention.⁶⁹ These various features of the Internet make leaderless jihad possible.

A Syrian member of al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Suri, advanced an operational strategy of decentralization to fit contemporary conditions. His 1,600-page online tome, *A Global Islamic Resistance*, seeks to provoke a global Islamic uprising led by autonomous cells and individual jihadists. In it, he argued that it was folly for the movement to fight from fixed locations, because their units could be trapped where Western forces could eventually invade and destroy them. Furthermore, he saw the traditional hierarchical model of a terrorist group as outdated, because if authorities could capture one member, that could put the whole organization at risk. Taking these factors into account, al-Suri proposed a "jihad of individual terrorism" in which self-contained cells implement their own terrorist template to start their own jihad. What is critical is a shared ideology that serves to create a feeling of common cause and unity of purpose. There would be no formal organizational links between the cells. This model fosters adaptability and creativity in the realm of terrorism. He advises Islamists to focus on jihad in their own countries of residence.⁷⁰

The power of the Internet is integral to al-Suri's strategy of individual terrorism because it serves as a mobilization tool. To make leaderless resistance orderly, al-Suri recognized that it was necessary to direct such actions through strategic guidance from al-Qaeda's leaders to ensure a

unity of purpose. Al-Qaeda's leaders have taken his advice, as demonstrated by locally recruited cells carrying out attacks under the guidance of the parent organization, as in the Madrid and London attacks.⁷¹

As Marc Sageman explained, the Internet is central to the evolution of contemporary terrorism. Specifically, the vast system of active communications that includes e-mail, list servers, and chat rooms is essential in forging networks. The Internet has undermined the traditional hierarchy of terrorist organizations, thus paving the way for "leaderless jihad." Sageman argues that al-Qaeda's new modus operandi is to advertise demands for terrorist operations on the Internet in the hope that local networks will provide the terrorist activities on their own without direct guidance from the central organization. In many cases, al-Qaeda merely telegraphs its desire for attacks.⁷² Each small terrorist organization may pursue disruptive activities for its own local reasons, but by doing so, it promotes al-Qaeda's grand strategy. Often, the local group receives recognition from al-Qaeda only after the fact.⁷³

A few examples illustrate this tactical approach. On 1 August 2007, an al-Qaeda website promised that a big surprise would soon occur. Although the message did not specify the precise nature of the surprise, the accompanying visual displayed a montage of Pres. George W. Bush with then-visiting Afghan president Hamid Karzai and Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf against a backdrop of the White House in flames, thus suggesting that they should be targeted. This was followed on 5 August by a video in which Adam Gadahn, an American al-Qaeda spokesman, warned that US embassies would be attacked.⁷⁴ Such threats have of course become commonplace in al-Qaeda discourse but, as terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins observes, highlight the organization's communications strategy. Gadahn's videotape threatened no specific action; rather, it identified targets that ought to be attacked and left it up to jihadists to act on their own initiative.⁷⁵ Not long thereafter, he appeared in another video in which he seemingly commanded sleeper agents to attack nuclear power plants inside the United States.⁷⁶

More threats would follow. In March 2010, al-Qaeda's media army, as-Sahab, released a videotape in which Gadahn commended MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, calling him an "ideal role model" whose lone wolf terrorism should be a model of emulation for other jihadists in America and the West.⁷⁷ And in June of 2011, Gadahn appeared in another video, titled "Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task

upon Yourself,” in which he urged Muslims in the United States to take advantage of lax firearm laws to purchase guns and carry out attacks on their own initiative.⁷⁸ Such threats, often conveyed through the new media, are an integral part of al-Qaeda’s grand strategy.

As terrorism analyst Peter Bergen observed, the increasing role of Gadahn is indicative of the Americanization of al-Qaeda’s leadership.⁷⁹ For example, Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemini cleric who grew up in New Mexico, played an important operational role for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and reached out to several American jihadists. He exerted a strong influence on Major Hasan with whom he exchanged e-mails several times before the attack at Fort Hood. Al-Awlaki met with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who was arrested for his alleged attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day in 2009. His sermons also inspired Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to set off a car bomb in New York’s Times Square in May 2010, and Zachary Chesser, a Fairfax, Virginia, man of Somali origin who was arrested on charges of trying to join the Somali Islamic terrorist group al-Shabab. Once characterized as the “bin Laden of the Internet,” Al-Awlaki’s pronouncements are broadcast on sites such as YouTube.⁸⁰

US intelligence agencies identified al-Awlaki as the “chief of external operations” for al-Qaeda’s Yemini branch. By skillfully combining religious doctrine with colloquial Western references, al-Awlaki appealed to disaffected Muslims in the West whom he exhorted to join al-Qaeda’s jihad. Presented in an emotional rather than intellectual style, his sermons were easily comprehensible without a deep knowledge of Islamic history or complex theological arguments. Ironically, it was his lack of depth as a Salafist cleric that added to his authenticity and accessibility. He offered his listeners the unvarnished “truth” that cut to the issues that mattered in their daily lives.⁸¹ His online speech, “Constants on the Path to Jihad,” has been described as a “virtual bible for lone wolf extremists.”⁸² On 30 September 2011, a US military drone attack in Yemen killed al-Awlaki. Just two weeks later, another strike in Yemen killed his 16-year-old son.⁸³

In 2010, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group based in Yemen launched an English-language online magazine titled *Inspire*, which contained a foreword by Osama bin Laden in which he encouraged “individual jihad” against Americans and Westerners. One article suggested random shooting rampages in crowded restaurants in Washington, DC, at lunch hour,

while another instructed readers on how to weld blades to the front of a pickup truck so it could be used as a mowing machine—not to mow grass but to “mow down the enemies of Allah.” A similar tactic was actually employed in 2006 by Mohammed Taheri-azar, an Iranian-born US citizen who injured nine persons with a sports utility vehicle on the campus of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.⁸⁴

Several jihadist terrorist conspiracies suggest a strong Internet link. The bombing plot against the London transit system on 7 July 2005 is instructive. According to some sources, al-Qaeda had a role in supporting the locally recruited cell that carried out the attack, which killed 52 and injured more than 700 others. In a 2004 tract, al-Suri instructed how a leader should form cells and recruit from individuals who are able to influence a wide circle of friends. Although some of those involved in the Madrid and London attacks reached out to more-experienced jihadists for help and guidance, the important point is, the cells were autonomously formed, following al-Suri’s model.⁸⁵ Hussein Osman, a defendant in the London bomb trial, told investigators that although he had no direct contacts to al-Qaeda, he regularly visited the organization’s websites, viewed their videos, and read their propaganda.⁸⁶ He explained to investigators that he and his group regularly watched videos of the Iraq war and used the Internet to “read up” on jihad. Although he denied any direct link to al-Qaeda, he admitted to using the organization’s online platforms.⁸⁷

The six Muslim men involved in the 2007 Fort Dix plot were united via the Internet, where they downloaded videos of Osama bin Laden preaching inspirational jihadist messages. The men allegedly planned to sneak onto the Army base to carry out a terrorist attack but were arrested after a store clerk alerted authorities. The accused had hired the clerk to dub a video of their training and practice attacks onto a digital disk intended for Internet use.⁸⁸ Similarly, a terrorist plot involving 17 young Muslims was foiled by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 2006 after surveillance of an online chat room revealed inflammatory anti-Western rhetoric which was thought to have precipitated a home-grown bomb plot.⁸⁹

Some observers argue that radical Islamist sites might actually have a cathartic effect by serving as an outlet and alternative for would-be jihadists to vent their anger.⁹⁰ However, case studies illustrate how online, virtual jihadists can make the transition to real-world terrorists. For

some, the gap between online involvement and real-world action can be a source of angst. For instance, in an attempt to restore balance between virtual and real-world jihad, Jordanian physician Humam al-Balawi blew himself up in a suicide bombing attack on 30 December 2009 against a CIA base near Khost, Afghanistan.⁹¹ Following a similar path, a Portland teenager using the online moniker “Ibn al-Mubarak” researched and wrote articles for the online pro-al-Qaeda magazine, *Jihad Recollections*. After publishing three articles there, he sought to publish in *Inspire*. In late 2010, he transitioned from cyber to real-world terrorism when he attempted to detonate a bomb at a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony in Portland.⁹²

Al-Qaeda’s appropriation of the new media, however, is not without drawbacks. To a certain extent, this has taken much control out of the leadership’s hands. Their appeal to the lowest common denominator will inevitably lead to unaffiliated individuals and groups operating in the name of al-Qaeda carrying out acts counterproductive to the movement’s overall strategic objectives.⁹³ As a result of the democratization and decentralization of the media, would-be leaders find it increasingly difficult to exercise control over the debate in their ideological circles.⁹⁴ This was illustrated by Mohamed Merah, a 23-year-old French citizen of Algerian descent, who in March 2012 videotaped some of his attacks that resulted in the deaths of seven people—three French paratroopers, three Jewish schoolchildren, and a rabbi—over the course of 10 days. He hoped that Al Jazeera would broadcast his videos for propaganda effect.⁹⁵ If Al Jazeera had followed through with his desires, it is hard to fathom how it could have been anything other than a public relations embarrassment for all but the most fanatical of jihadists.

Implications

In the unipolar era, the United States was thought to have a near monopoly on “soft power,” which Joseph Nye described as the ability to determine the framework of the debate in international affairs.⁹⁶ However, the popularity of the Internet has led to a diffusion of soft power around the world. Extremist and terrorist groups are now exploiting the new media and youth culture as powerful recruitment tools to communicate their views and incite violence.⁹⁷ Increasingly, there is cross-fertilization between the “old media”—such as major television networks

and traditional news outlets—and the new media, including YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook.⁹⁸ A dialectic between the old and new media is now underway in which consumers increasingly participate, contribute, and modify the content.

The growth and expansion of the media was an important factor in the rise of terrorism in the 1970s.⁹⁹ It is no coincidence that contemporary terrorism gained prominence concomitant with the media age which allowed the widespread dissemination of news and events around the world. Today, media products created by the major networks can be recycled and refashioned to fit the designs of dissident groups. For example, local affiliates supplement al-Qaeda Central and combine archival material with local content. Groups as varied as Hezbollah, Hamas, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Shining Path of Peru, and White Aryan Resistance (WAR) have propaganda videos on YouTube. The increased availability of sophisticated but inexpensive video-capturing hardware and interactive online network platforms has revolutionized terrorists' online communications.¹⁰⁰

Modern technology facilitates the leaderless resistance trend in terrorism in several ways. First, the Internet can serve as a conduit for information flow which enhances recruiting. Second, secure communications—strengthened through such devices as encryption, free e-mail accounts, Internet relay chat, steganography, anonymous remailers, and web-based bulletin boards—make it difficult to link a message with an individual, thus enhancing operational security.¹⁰¹ Third, through Internet gathering points, such as electronic chat rooms, dispersed individuals can share information and develop a shared worldview which subsumes their local agendas in support of a common goal.¹⁰² Some groups avoid membership lists and place much recruitment effort on the Internet. Through that medium, one can become a true believer of the ideology without any formal organizational nexus.¹⁰³

Websites can even serve to instigate terrorism without any specific nexus to the perpetrators. As an example, the Nuremberg Files—a website operated by Neal Horsley, an antiabortion activist in Oregon—listed the names and addresses of doctors who performed abortions and contained unsubtle suggestions that there should be some kind of retribution against them. In February 1999, the site was removed by its ISP after a red line was drawn through the name of Dr. Barnett Slepian on the day he was killed by an antiabortion assassin.¹⁰⁴ As illustrated by

this case, Internet activism blurs the distinctions on acts that constitute terrorism. On the Internet, supporters can openly cheer for al-Qaeda by replicating the organization's message in the form of videos, audio files, composite images, and monographs without resorting to actual terrorism.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the new media have the potential to rapidly polarize segments of society and create a charged atmosphere conducive to violence. For example, statements made by Dan Cathy, chief operations officer of Chick-fil-A, in expressing his opposition to same-sex marriage sparked numerous debates on Facebook and other online outlets. On 15 August 2012, Floyd Lee Corkins II, armed with a 9 mm handgun and carrying a satchel with a bag from a Chick-fil-A restaurant, entered the headquarters of the Family Research Council, a conservative political organization that opposes abortion and same-sex marriages. He made disparaging remarks about the group and then opened fire, but a security guard, who was wounded in the attack, wrestled him to ground before he could inflict more damage.¹⁰⁶

In their study, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age*, Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker examine the intersection of technology and insurgency. Two contemporaneous trends—the growing popularity of the World Wide Web and the rise of insurgencies—are shaping the course of modern warfare. As they observed, military applications previously spurred novel media technologies such as radio, television, and the Internet; however, that phenomenon has been reversed, as it is now the new media that shape contemporary warfare. New technology has increased the options for irregular forces more than for governments and armies, but in counterintuitive ways. Ironically, Rid and Hecker find a reversal of historic trends. First, regular armies engaged in counterinsurgency operations are refining the use of modern information technology for *external* purposes—to reach the local population in the theater of operations. By contrast, insurgents are increasingly using the Internet for *internal* purposes—to communicate with fellow irregulars. Still, insurgents and their supporters have become increasingly sophisticated in getting out their side of the story. New podcasting capabilities enable amateurs to record and disseminate graphic battlefield images. In sum, recent innovations in information technology have leveled the playing field for irregular forces.¹⁰⁷

The ease with which people can upload material to the Internet has the potential to introduce innovative methods of terrorist exhortation.

For example, terrorism from the American extreme right has often been marked by ineptitude. Extreme right groups are infiltrated by both government agents and undercover operatives working for private monitoring organizations. In that setting, planning terrorist attacks is problematic due to a strong risk of exposure and manipulation by agents provocateurs. By contrast, radical Islamists, despite many failures, have carried out several lethal attacks in the West, as evidenced by the 9/11, Madrid, and London attacks. Insofar as the American extreme right and radical Islam share a very similar concept of who they consider to be the enemy—Jews and the US government—what would stop an enterprising extreme rightist from donning a Keffiyeh mask, reciting some Koranic verses, and exhorting Islamists to attack specific targets that would further the revolutionary goals of the extreme right?

The case of David Myatt is instructive. Arguably England's principal proponent of contemporary neo-Nazi ideology and theoretician of revolution, in 1998 he converted to Islam, assumed the nom de guerre "Abdul Aziz," and openly announced his support for Osama bin Laden and his declared war against the United States and Israel. Myatt's articles on the World Wide Web exhort his Aryan followers to make common cause with the Islamists. The primary battle against the ZOG, he says, has shifted from the West to the Islamic world, in areas such as Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq.¹⁰⁸ Conceivably, a person from one terrorist orientation could seek to inspire those in another since different terrorist movements often target the same enemies.

The growing pervasiveness of the new media brings new opportunities for oppositional groups to reach out to larger audiences than in the past. The democratization of the media has empowered many who previously would not have much voice in the marketplace of ideas. Chris Anderson, editor-in-chief of *Wired* magazine, developed the concept of the "long tail" to explain how new Internet platforms such as Amazon enable firms to employ a niche marketing strategy in which they sell large volumes of unique items to a larger number of customers instead of selling only a lesser variety of popular items in large quantities. The major reason is because the Internet lets customers choose from a vast number of products. The long-tail operation makes it easier for a highly specialized company to be viable and enter a market without having a locally concentrated customer base. A similar logic applies to extremist groups and terrorism in that a large popular following is not required.

Likewise, in the information age, a relatively low number of highly motivated, partly self-recruited, and geographically dispersed followers can share an extremist cause without broad appeal, thus making niche terrorism possible.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, sophisticated tools with uses that are not always benevolent continue to be developed and made widely available, and in complex, contemporary societies, there are a myriad of soft targets which, if disrupted, can cause major perturbations throughout the system.¹¹⁰ Consequently, a few angry people now have the potential to cause unprecedented destruction. The frequency of sporadic episodes of lone wolf terrorism in the headlines suggests leaderless resistance has become the most common tactical approach to political violence in the West.¹¹¹ The Internet and the new media have been instrumental in this trend by enabling representatives of extremist and dissident subcultures to reach out to potential sympathizers dispersed around the world so that terrorist movements can now survive without formal organizations.

How should policymakers confront this problem? The new media are generally unregulated and difficult to police. A legal argument has been made that online forums, such as Twitter, could be held culpable for provident “material support of terrorism.” Discussion groups that are forums for radical discourse often display notices indicating the material displayed on the sites does not necessarily reflect the views of the administrators, thus suggesting a waiver of liability. Since users can have multiple, fraudulent, and shifting identities, they are hard to trace. And site administrators are often slow to act against threats posted online.¹¹² To counter these online threats, some have recommended the use of various material support statutes to hold ISPs responsible for the content of websites. Others, such as Aaron Weisbord who operates the online monitoring site, Internet Haganah (Hebrew for *defense*), have sought to “shame” those ISPs that host terrorist-related sites so they will sever their connections.¹¹³ One innovative initiative underway to counter online extremism is a software program that would allow the US military to secretly manipulate social media sites by using fake online identities. In March 2012, a California company was awarded a contract by the US Central Command (CENTCOM) to develop an “online persona management service” that would enable one US serviceman to control up to 10 identities based around the world. The operators would seek to influence Internet discussions and spread pro-American propaganda.¹¹⁴

More direct approaches to counterterrorism can be applied to lone wolves inspired by radical online forums. To be sure, government authorities should deal resolutely with lone wolves who commit serious crimes. However, blanket repression against extremist and dissident subcultures that hold unpopular beliefs should be avoided. Although state repression can be effective, especially if the targeted group or community has not established deep roots, it can also backfire. Arguably, the 1992 Ruby Ridge and 1993 Waco fiascos were counterproductive. In particular, the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, which resulted in the death of 76 persons, enraged Timothy McVeigh and set him on his course of action which culminated in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City—the most horrific act of domestic terrorism prior to 9/11. Resentment from how the US government handled these events did much to fuel the militia movement in the mid 1990s.

Another strategy to counter the threat of online extremism is community engagement. In August 2011, the White House released a document titled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” The report warned that political extremism had the potential to divide the nation. Rather than blaming certain communities, the report called for forging community partnerships. Information about the threat of radicalization and violence could be provided to a wide range of community groups and organizations. According to the report, the government should be ready to respond to community concerns about government policies and actions. The report also called for more monitoring of the Internet and social network sites to understand their role in advancing violent extremist narratives.¹¹⁵ Perhaps the most effective approach to countering the threat of exhortation would be to use elements of the new media, including YouTube and similar platforms, to post videos and improve public relations.

Traditionally, the military has maintained centralized control over information. The emergence of the new media, however, calls for a more decentralized approach. The propaganda that the US government seeks to counteract reaches a wide variety of audiences. To meet this challenge, those web forums and new media platforms that are instrumental in disseminating terrorist propaganda must be identified. Only by embracing the new media and disseminating compelling counternarratives, can the hearts and minds of audiences be won. **SSQ**

Notes

1. Substantial documentary evidence suggests that terrorism was an important instrument of Soviet statecraft. Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 42–51.
2. Barak Mendelsohn, *Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
3. “Over Two Billion People Now Connected to Internet but Digital Divide Remains Wide—UN,” *UN News Centre*, 6 November 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewID=43424&Cr=digital+divide&Cr1=>.
4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).
5. John Curtis Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 35, no. 5 (May 2012): 339–40.
6. Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 7.
7. Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges* (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 24–25; and Michael Whine, “The Use of the Internet by Far Right Extremists,” in *Cybercrime: Law, Security and Privacy in the Information Age*, eds. Brian Loader and Douglas Thomas (London: Routledge, 2000); also available at www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=413.
8. Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson, “Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 45 (2nd Quarter 2007): 100.
9. Nayan Chanda and Strobe Talbott, *The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), xiii.
10. Lachow and Richardson, “Terrorist Use of the Internet,” 101.
11. Susan Miller, “Census Predicts Decline of Whites,” *Washington Times*, 18 March 2004.
12. Jack Kay, “Communicating through Electronic Bulletin Boards in the White Supremacy Movement: Creating Culture via Computer,” paper presented at the International Communication Association Conference, Mass Communication Division, New Orleans, June 1988.
13. Previously, Black had been affiliated with the National Socialist White People’s Party, the successor to George Lincoln Rockwell’s American Nazi Party. Later, he joined the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, which was led by David Duke at the time. The two developed an enduring friendship. Black even married Duke’s ex-wife and helped raise his two daughters. In 1981, Black was arrested for his role in a bizarre 1981 plot to invade the Caribbean island of Dominica and overthrow its government. Supposedly, the plan was to spark a coup led by Don Black and nine other white mercenaries who would lead disgruntled black soldiers against the island nation’s 70-man police force. He spent 1982 to 1985 in a federal prison in Texas, where he studied computers and became quite proficient in their use. He settled in Palm Beach, FL, in 1987. David Schwab Abel, “The Racist Next Door,” *Broward-Palm Beach New Times*, 19 February 1998.
14. Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, “Exploring ‘Stormfront’: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 11 (2009): 996–97.
15. See Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” *Seditionist* 12 (February 1992): 12–13; Beam, “Understanding the Struggle or Why We Have to Kill the Bastards,” in *Essays of a Klansman*, ed. Beam (Hayden Lake, ID: A.K.I.A. Publications, 1983), 45–51; and Beam, “Understanding the Struggle Part II,” in *Essays of a Klansman*, 52–72.

16. Statements by McVeigh seem to indicate that *The Turner Diaries* may have been determinative in his choice of target and his decision to carry out the attack. See Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, *American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing* (New York: Diane Publishing Co., 2001), 304. For more on the Order, see Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood: Inside America's Racist Underground* (New York: Free Press, 1989). For more on the Aryan Republican Army, see Mark S. Hamm, *In Bad Company: America's Terrorist Underground* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001). For more on David Copeland, see Graeme McLagan and Nick Lowles, *Mr. Evil* (London: John Blake Publishing, 2000).

17. John Sutherland, "Gospels of Hate that Slip through the Net," *Guardian* (UK), 3 April 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/mcveigh/story/0,7369,488284,00.html>; and David Segal, "The Pied Piper of Racism," *Washington Post*, 12 January 2000.

18. For more on Pierce's revolutionary strategy, see George Michael, "The Revolutionary Model of Dr. William L. Pierce," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 62–80.

19. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a monitoring organization based in Montgomery, AL, has won several civil suits against extreme right groups and individuals. In doing so, the SPLC has effectively shut them down. For more on the SPLC's response to the extreme right, see George Michael, *Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

20. This is according to an Anti-Defamation League (ADL) report, "Alex Curtis: 'Lone Wolf' of Hate Prowls the Internet," 2000, <http://www.adl.org/curtis/default.htm>.

21. On the July Fourth weekend of 1999, Benjamin Smith, a former member of the World Church of the Creator who had recently resigned from the organization, embarked on a shooting spree in Illinois and Indiana that left two dead and several injured. Edward Walsh, "'Appalled' Reno Pledges Review of Midwest Shootings," *Washington Post*, 9 July 1999, A-12. In April of 2000, Richard Baumhammers, an immigration attorney and founder of a minuscule right-wing organization, the Free Market Party, killed five people—his Jewish neighbor, three Asian-Americans, and one Black—in a shooting rampage near Pittsburgh. Lynne Duke, "Pittsburgh Reels from another Apparent Hate Crime," *Washington Post*, 30 April 2000, A-4. David Copeland single-handedly conducted a campaign of terror in 1999 during which he bombed Bangladeshi, Black, and gay districts in London. His bombings killed three persons and injured 128 others. For more on Copeland, see McLagan and Lowles, *Mr. Evil*.

22. ADL, "Extremism in America: Alex Curtis," http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/curtis.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=2&item=curtis.

23. See Alex Curtis, "Biology for Aryans," *Nationalist Observer* no. 21 (June 2000): 1.

24. ADL, "Extremism in America."

25. Quoted in the ADL report, "Alex Curtis: 'Lone Wolf.'"

26. The alleged offenses include placing racist stickers at some of the victims' offices, placing a snake skin in the mail slot of Congressman Filner's office, spray painting anti-Semitic words and symbols on a synagogue, and perhaps the most serious act, placing an inactive hand grenade at Mayor Madrid's residence. For more on this investigation see the FBI's report "Operation Lone Wolf," 2000, <http://www.fbi.gov/majcses/lonewolf1/htm>.

27. ADL, "Alex Curtis."

28. See Harold Covington, *The March up Country* (Reedy, WV: Liberty Bell Publications, 1987).

29. He attained notoriety for his connection to the so-called Greensboro Massacre that occurred on 3 November 1979 when members of a neo-Nazi party, the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA), and a local Ku Klux Klan organization clashed with demonstrators

led by members of the Communist Workers Party in a “Death to the Klan” rally. The confrontation had been a culmination in a series of disputes between the two sides. A shootout ensued in which five members of the Communist Workers Party were fatally wounded. At that time, Covington was the leader of the NSPA and a principal organizer of the demonstration but was conspicuously absent from the actual event. Rumors surfaced that he was an informant and agent provocateur for the FBI, BATF, and CIA. Covington categorically denied these allegations. For more on the Greensboro Massacre, see Elizabeth Wheaton, *Codename Greenkil: The 1979 Greensboro Killings* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987). For a brief biographical sketch of Covington, see “Little Big Man,” *Intelligence Report* (Winter 2008), <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=980>.

30. Those novels are Harold A. Covington, *The Hill of the Ravens* (Bloomington, IN: 1stBooks, 2003), *A Distant Thunder* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2004), *A Mighty Fortress* (New York: iUniverse, 2005), and *The Brigade* (Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2008).

31. In his lectures, Covington referred to the US Supreme Court case *Brandenburg v. Ohio* (1969), which protected speech that advocated violence, but with limitations. Clarence Brandenburg was the leader of an Ohio-based Ku Klux Klan organization in the 1950s. During a rally, which was filmed by reporters, Brandenburg expressed his desire to expatriate Jews and African-Americans to Israel and Africa respectively. Several of his fellow klansmen were filmed carrying firearms. Based on this film, Ohio authorities charged him with violating an Ohio syndicalism law enacted in 1919 which forbade the spread of unpatriotic views and the advocacy of criminal syndicalism. In *Whitney v. California* and *Dennis v. United States*, the court upheld the right of the state to proscribe advocacy of violent means of effecting political change. However in *Brandenburg* the court sought to distinguish between the abstract advocacy of the use of force or law violation and the actual planning of an illegal act that was likely to result in its actual completion. In doing so, the court overruled *Whitney v. California* by deciding that the mere abstract advocacy of an illegal act that was not likely to incite or produce an illegal action was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In the court’s view, Brandenburg’s actions did not constitute a “clear and present danger.” For more on *Brandenburg v. Ohio* see Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, *Constitutional Law for a Changing America* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), 143–45.

32. Michael Vanderboght, “Absolved,” *The Price of Liberty*, 28 July 2008, <http://www.thepriceofliberty.org/08/07/28/absolved.htm>.

33. Greg Bluestein, “Feds: Online Novel Played Role in Ga. Militia Plot,” *Post and Courier* (Charleston, SC), 2 November 2011, <http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2011/nov/02/feds-online-novel-played-role-ga-militia-plot/>.

34. George Michael, “Anders Behring Breivik: A New Breed of Lone Wolf Terrorist?” *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 18, no. 1 (2012): 14–18.

35. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Afterword (September 2001): The Sharpening Fight for the Future,” in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, eds. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 367.

36. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Summary,” in *Networks and Netwars*, ix.

37. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, eds. Ian Lessler et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 45.

38. Paul de Armond, “Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tactics,” in *Networks and Netwars*, 210.

39. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 285–88.

40. Jim Redden, *Snitch Culture* (Venice, CA: Feral House, 2000), 151.
41. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 305.
42. Donald R. Liddick, *Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 64–67.
43. The software engineer Ward Cunningham created the first wiki in 1995. One of his fundamental assumptions was that people who collaborate with one another also tend to trust one another. His wiki—a user-editable website—became the model for subsequent wikis. Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* (New York: Portfolio, 2008), 111. As of 2008, Wikipedia had approximately 2.2 million entries—23 times the number of entries in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Jeff Howe, *Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd is Driving the Future of Business* (New York: Crown Business, 2008), 61.
44. Howe, *Crowdsourcing*, 52–55.
45. According to Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales, approximately 50 percent of edits are made by less than 1 percent of users. This suggests that behind the legion of users, there is a small but committed core who does most of the work. Tapscott and Williams, *Wikinomics*, 73.
46. Tom Whipple, “Scientology: The Anonymous Protestors,” *Times* (London), 20 June 2008.
47. Alexia Tsotsis, “My Date with Anonymous: A Rare Interview with the Elusive Internet Troublemakers,” *LA Weekly*, 4 February 2009, <http://www.laweekly.com/2009-02-05/columns/my-date-with-anonymous-a-rare-interview-with-the-illusive-internet-troublemakers/>.
48. Barton Gellman, “Anonymous,” *Time*, 18 April 2012, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112122,00.html.
49. “Anonymous’ Hackers Arrested in US Sweep,” *Herald Sun*, 20 July 2011, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/anonymous-hackers-arrested-in-us-sweep/story-e6frf7jx-1226097971794>; and Andy Greenberg, “Fourteen Anonymous Hackers Arrested For ‘Operation Avenge Assange,’ LulzSec Leader Claims He’s Not Affected,” *Forbes*, 19 July 2011, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/19/anonymous-arrests-continue-lulzsec-leader-claims-hes-not-affected/>.
50. Glen Greenwald, “The U.S. Government targets Twitter Terrorism,” *Salon.com*, 20 December 2010.
51. Hanna Rogan, “Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad: Virtual Battlefronts from Iraq to the Horn of Africa,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Summer/Fall 2007): 89.
52. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), 13.
53. As Rohan Gunaratna found, “in the twelve-month period ending December 2007, al Qaeda produced a cassette, sermon, or video every three days.” Gunaratna, “Al-Qaedastan: The Sanctuary of the Afghan-Pakistan Border,” *Intel File*, 12, http://events.fcw.com/events/2008/GLR/downloads/GLR08_T1_GUNARATNA_THE%20TERRORIST%20SANCTUARY%20OF%20THE%20AFGHAN-PAKISTAN%20BORDER.pdf. In the six years following 9/11, Osama bin Laden appeared in more than 20 videos and audiotapes. His chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri communicated more frequently, appearing in more than 40 productions during that period. Brian Michael Jenkins. *Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 247.
54. Rogan, “Abu Reuter and the E-Jihad.”
55. Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,” *New York Times*, 15 October 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html>.
56. Nadya Labi, “Jihad 2.0,” *Atlantic*, July/August 2006, 102–8.

57. Although YouTube pulled some videos, some of the others that Lieberman had requested were not removed because they were not violent or did not qualify as “hate speech.” Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda’s Growing Online Offensive,” *Washington Post*, 24 June 2008, A-1.

58. Brynjar Lia, “Jihadi Web Media Production: Characteristics, Trends, and Future Implications,” *Norwegian Armed Forces*, February 2007, http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00092/Jihadi_Web_Media_Pro_92100a.pdf.

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68. Gregory S. McNeal, “Cyber Embargo: Countering the Internet Jihad,” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 39, no. 3 (undated): 797–98.

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70. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30 (2007): 1–14.

71. Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ad Al-Suri* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

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90. *Ibid.*, 404.
91. Brachman and Levine, "You Too Can Be Awlaki!" 43.
92. *Ibid.*, 26.
93. *Ibid.*, 45.
94. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 204.
95. "Suspect in French Killing Spree Dead," *USA Today*, 22 March 2012, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-22/French-killing-spree/53697578/1>.
96. Such intangibles, including media, culture, and ideology, are in contrast to tangible resources such as military and economic might. Joseph Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 177–92.
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99. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 24.
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101. Definitions of these terms are in order. *Encryption* transforms electronically transmitted information so that it is unreadable for anyone except the person with a password that would allow the message to be decrypted. *Free e-mail accounts* are offered by certain sites that provide registration, e-mail construction, and sending and receiving facilities. *Internet relay chat* is a form of real-time text messaging, mainly designed for group communication in discussion forums but also allows for one-to-one communication by way of private messages. *Steganography* is the practice of embedding hidden messages within other messages or

images. An *anonymous re-mailer* is a server computer that receives messages with embedded instructions and then forwards them without revealing the original source. *Web-based bulletin boards* are areas on websites where users can leave and/or erase messages so that other people can read them.

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109. Rid and Hecker, *War 2.0*, 219–20.
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111. For example, using FBI data on terrorism, Smith and Damphousse found that prior to 1976 the average number of members indicted in each right wing terrorist group was 9.4. After 1976, that figure had dropped to 5.8. A similar pattern was evident for international terrorist groups operating in the United States, with a figure of six members prior to 1976 and three thereafter. Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse, *American Terrorism Study: Patterns of Behavior, Investigation, and Prosecution of American Terrorists* (Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice, 2002), 6. Similarly, during the period from 1955 to 1977, 7 percent of all terrorist fatalities in the United States were attributed to individuals, according to the research of Christopher Hewitt. However, for the period from 1978 to 1999, that proportion rose to 26 percent. Christopher Hewitt, *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda* (London: Routledge, 2003), 78. Likewise, the US Department of State observed a trend whereby more dispersed, localized, and smaller-scale groups are increasingly active in terrorism, often with great lethal effect. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), chap. 2.
112. Torok, “Make a Bomb in Your Mums [sic] Kitchen,” 59.
113. McNeal, “Cyber Embargo,” 788–826.
114. Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US Spy Operation that Manipulates Social Media,” *Guardian*, 17 March 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks>.
115. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington: The White House, August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf).